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THE IMPACT OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
ON THE NEW YORK STATE ALIMONY STATUTE
On March 22, 1972, by a vote of 84-8, the United States Senate

passed a proposed twenty-seventh amendment to the United States
Constitution,' and in turn submitted it to the legislatures of the states
for ratification. 2 The amendment, commonly known as the Equal
Rights' Amendment,3 purports to mandate equality of rights under the
law to both sexes and as such, if ratified,4 will clearly have an impact
on state law. 5 This Comment will examine and assess the probable
impact of the ERA on a specific state law-New York's alimony
statute.6
In order to gauge the impact of the ERA on the New York provision, it is necessary to provide a general overview of the ERA7 and
note how alimony in general, and New York's alimony statute in
particular, has operated up to the present time. After examining the
potential effect of the ERA on DRL 236, this Comment will develop
several hypothetical situations which suggest some standards or considerations a court might develop in analyzing alimony issues under
an "ERA-modified" DRL 236. Finally, the overall effect of such a
modification on actual alimony awards and on society in general will
be presented.
1. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
2. Final ratification of the amendment requires ratification by three-fourths, or 38,
of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V.

3. Hereinafter referred to as ERA.
4. To date, 33 of the necessary 38 states have ratified the ERA. U.S.C.A.
amend. 14, at 169 (Supp. 1974).

5. K.

DAVIDSON,

R.

GINSBURG &

H.

CONST.

KAY, CASES & MATERIALS ON SEx-BASED

115 (1974) (indicating that there are several studies which have found
that hundreds of state statutes contain sex-based references which will require legislative
review under the ERA).
6. N.Y. DoM, REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1974) [hereinafter referred to
as DRL 236 in the text].
7. This Comment will deal with specific arguments for and against the ERA as it
relates to alimony provisions. For a thorough discussion of the background of the ERA,
see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment, 80 YALE L.J.
871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown]. For arguments for and against the ERA, see
DiSCXUINATION

Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HAxv. Crv. RIGHTS-Crv. L. REv. 243

(1971); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection, 84 HAv. L. Rnv. 1499
(1971).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

I. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL ERA
A. Its Intent
The ERA reads as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date
of ratification.8
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated that the intent of the
ERA is to require "that the federal government and all state and
local governments treat each person, male and female, as an individual." 9 Senator Birch Bayh, a major proponent of the proposed
amendment, interprets the ERA to "simply [prohibit] discrimination
on the basis of a person's sex."' 10 However, there are two exceptions
to the general notion of prohibited sex classifications under the ERA.
The intermingling of the sexes is not required where the right of
privacy dictates that the sexes be separated and reasonable classifications based on characteristics truly unique to one sex are not proscribed."
In fourteenth amendment equal protection terms, the ERA will
make sex a prohibited classification. A leading article on the ERA
explains that
[t]he basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that sex
is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women,
or of men. This means that the treatment of any person by the law
may not be based upon the circumstance that such person is of one
sex or the other. The law does, of course, impose different benefits
or different burdens upon different members of the society. That
differentiation in treatment may rest upon particular characteristics
or traits of the persons affected, such as strength, intelligence, and the
like. But under the Equal Rights Amendment the existence of such a
8. Proposed Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, H.R.J.
Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
9. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972).
10. Bayh, The Equal Rights Amendment, 6 IND. L.J. 1, 12 (1972).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 359, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971). The report notes as an
example of the privacy exception "a separation of the sexes with respect to such places
as public toilets . . . ." Id. at 7. The unique characteristics exception would permit "a
law providing for payment of the medical costs of child bearing." Id.
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characteristic or trait to a greater degree in one sex does not justify
classification by sex rather than by the particular characteristic or
trait. Likewise the law may make different rules for some people than.
for others on the basis of the activity they are engaged in or the
function they perform. But the fact that in our present society members of one sex are more likely to be found in a particular activity or
to perform a particular function does not allow the law to fix legal
rights by virtue of membership in that sex. In short, sex is a prohibited classification.1
Thus, the ERA will foreclose the necessity for further attempts to
have sex declared a "suspect" classification, 3 and will instead serve
as a basis for legislative alteration of sex discrimination laws, a stimulus to equality between the sexes,' 4 and a foundation for change in
legal structures and attitudes.15
B. Its Effect
By its own terms, the ERA will not take effect until two years
after it is ratified.' 6 The purpose of this delay is to allow state legisla12. Brown, supra note 7, at 889. See also THE MINORITY REPORT ON THE EQUAL
HousE JUDICIARY Comm., H.R. REP. No. 359, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 5-8 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). These cases represent recent attempts to have sex declared a suspect classification. In Frontiero, the Court held that
certain challenged federal statutes violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment
because they accorded "differential treatment to male and female members of the uniRIGHTS AMENDMENT OF THE

formed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience.. .

."
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U.S. at 690-91. Four Justices came to this conclusion after deciding that sex classifications were "suspect' and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. But the four concurring
Justices did not go so far, and instead invalidated the statute on the basis of Reed. In
Kahn, the Court upheld a state statutory classification which granted all widows a
particular tax exemption but denied the same exemption to all widowers. The majority
in Kahn distinguished Frontiero on several grounds, the most notable being that Kahn
involved the power of a state to tax property. In light of this power, states are allowed
considerable leeway in making reasonable classifications. Kahn and Frontiero may therefore mark the limit to which a fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis may be
carried vis-A-vis sex classifications. For a background discussion of equal protection
arguments, see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rnv. 1065

(1969).
14. See Brown, supra note 7, at 979-80. See generally Gabler, The Impact of the
ERA on Domestic Relations Law, 8 FAmILY L.Q. 51 (1974); Comment, The Effect of
the Equal Rights Amendment on Kentucky's Domestic Relations Laws, 12 J. FAMILY L.
151 (1973); Note, The Effect of the Equal Rights Amendment on Minnesota Law, 57
MINN. L. REv. 771 (1973).
15. See Brown, supra note 7, at 979-80. See generally Comment, The Equal Rights
Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. Rxv. 917 (1973).
16. Proposed Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution,
H.R.J. Res. 208, § 3, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
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tures a period during which they can review their state statutes and
revise those which conflict with the ERA. 17 One commentator has
indicated that such review will entail testing the statutes against the
following three-part question:
1) Does a particular law make a distinction between men and
women?

2) Is the distinction permissible?
3) If not, should the statute be invalidated or extended to apply to
both sexes equally?' 8
When evaluated in light of this three-part question, many state
domestic relations laws will require alteration because they make
ERA-prohibited sex classifications. 9 Alimony statutes in particular will
bear close scrutiny because they distinguish between husbands and
wives. 20
II.

ALIMONY

A. General Operation
Historically, alimony has been an award made to wives based
21
upon the common-law obligation of a husband to support his wife.
The husband's common-law obligation is now statutorily defined and,
with some exceptions, there is no corresponding duty of a wife to
support her husband. 2 Thus, the argument made in support of alimony awards to wives after divorce or separation derives from the
husband's duty of support during the marriage and the fact that the
wife has no similar common-law or statutory duty to support herself
17. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972).
18. Gabler, supra note 14, at 54.

19. See Brown, supra note 7, at 936-54. See also Behles & Behles, Equal Rights in

Divorce and Separation, 3 N. MEx. L. REv. 118 (1973)

(examination of the effects of

a proposed ERA to New Mexico's constitution, the intent of which is analogous to that
of the federal ERA); Gabler, supra note 14; Comment, supra note 14; Note, supra
note 14.

20. See materials cited note 19 supra.
21. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441-42; cf. Manby v. Scott, 86 ENO.
REP. 781 (Ex. 1659).

22. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 32(1) (McKinney 1964) (husband's liability
for support of his wife). In New York, the wife's only liability for support of her husband is "if he is incapable of supporting himself and is or is likely to become a public
charge." Id. § 32(4) (McKinney Supp. 1974). See also N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 412
(McKinney 1973); id. § 415 (McKinney, Supp. 1974).
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or her spouse. The New York Court of Appeals further indicated in
a 1940 case that its power to require support by the husband was
"justified by the public concern that wife and children shall not be
left without suitable provision for support and for education."23 This
remark indicates that, at least in New York, the purpose of alimony
has grown from a husband's duty of support to the protection of a
wife and the public fisc.
Historically, alimony has been awarded only to women.2 4 The
husband is presumed to have the duty and ability to support himself
and therefore does not need alimony. Moreover, since the wife has
had no duty to support her husband during the marriage, there is
no basis for an alimony award to the husband upon divorce. State
courts have uniformly held that no alimony can be awarded to husbands in the absence of special statutory authority. 25 Whether based
upon a public policy or state interest in providing divorced wives with
a source of support, or the societal stereotypes of husbands and wives,
it is clear that absent statutory modification husbands face discrimination in alimony settlements.
By statute, twenty-eight states now offer some type of alimony
for husbands. 2 In some instances, however, the grant of alimony is
conditioned upon such factors as the inability of a husband to support
himself- 7 or his insanity.28 These statutory modifications of the com23. Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 302, 26 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1940).
24. See Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 880 (1959).
25. See Comment, Alimony for Men, 3 KAN. L. REv. 357 (1955). See also Annot.,
66 A.L.R.2d 880 (1959).
26. Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (Supp. 1973); CAL. Civ. CODE § 4801
(West Supp. 1974); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5 (Cum. Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.08 (Supp. 1974); HAwA REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, §§ 16, 19 (Supp. 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.17, .21 (Supp. 1974);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (Supp. 1974); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.200 (Supp.
1972); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (Supp. 1974) (alimony for husband in
the nature of a property division); Micr. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 552.13 (Supp. 1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.54, .55 (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.330, .335
(Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.22
(Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-7-6
to -7-13 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (Supp. 1973) (husband is deemed
the supporting spouse unless proved incapable of supporting the wife); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-05-24 (1971); Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1964); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1284 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1973); R.I. GEN.
LAWs ANN. §§ 15-5-5 to -7-9 (1970); Tax. FAm. CODE § 4.03 (1974); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 30-3-3 to -3-5 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 754 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-107 (Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-15 (1966).
27. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (Supp. 1973).
28. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
28, §§ 45, 48 (Supp. 1974).
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mon-law rule prohibiting alimony for husbands reflect the current
trend in the direction of equal treatment of husbands and wives.2"
B. The New York Alimony Statute-DRL 236
DRL 236 does not provide for an alimony award to the husband,
but does presume that the wife is entitled to such an award. The
relevant section of the statute provides:
In any action or proceeding brought (1) during the lifetime of both
parties to the marriage to annul a marriage or declare the nullity of
a void marriage, or (2) for a separation, or (3) for a divorce, the
court may direct the husband to provide suitably for the support of
the wife as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard
to the length of time of the marriage, the ability of the wife to be
self supporting, the circumstances of the case and of the respective
parties. 30
On its face, therefore, DRL 236 makes a sex-based classification which
results in the unequal treatment of husbands. It operates to presumptively entitle all wives to alimony and presumptively deny alimony
to all husbands. DRL 236 makes only one exception to the statutory
scheme by denying alimony to a wife where her misconduct is such
as "would itself constitute grounds for separation or divorce." 31
Legislative changes in DRL 236 have focused on "additional
guidelines for the discretion of the court in establishing support requirements. '32 For example, in 1968 the legislature added the phrase
"the length of time of the marriage, the ability of the wife to be self
supporting"3 3 to DRL 236 in order to define more clearly the parameters of the court's discretion in making an award. In its memoranda
concerning the change, the Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family Laws indicated that the language was added to
the statute in light of the fact that in "current economic life ...

many

women possess the ability to be self supporting" and that, in the

29. Brown, supra note 7, at 937. See also Foster & Freed, Family Law, 25 SYRA-

cusn L. REv. 401, 402-03 (1974).
30. N.Y. Dom.

REL. LAW

§ 236 (McKinney Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).

31. Id.
32. Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family Law, Memorandum

in Support of A-2941-A, 1968 N.Y.S. LEo. ANNUAL 30.
33. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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legislature's judgment, courts should take this fact into account in

establishing alimony.3 4 Bills designed to allow alimony awards to husbands have been introduced into the legislature, but none has so far
been passed and subsequently signed into law. 5
In their application of DRL 236 and its predecessors, New York
36
courts have observed the legislative intent underlying the statute.
For example, in Doyle v. Doyle,37 the supreme court, on a motion to
resettle a previous alimony order, said that "alimony is basically the
statutory substitute for the marital obligation of a husband to support
his wife." The courts have not applied the statute automatically, however, even in the face of a presumptive entitlement to an award. One
reason is that DRL 236 itself provides an exception to the wife's
presumptive entitlement to alimony38 where her conduct is such as
would be grounds for separation or divorce.3 9 Second, the court has
34. Joint Legislative Committee, supra note 32, at 32.
35. See, e.g., N.Y.S. 9571, 197th Sess. (1974) (this bill, introduced by Senator
Pisard, would have repealed DRL 236 and substituted therefor a provision allowing
maintenance to either party). See also Steinberg v. Steinberg, 360 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2d
Dep't 1974), in which a husband's motion for temporary alimony and counsel fees was
denied. The court indicated that provisions for alimony to husbands will have to originate inthe Legislature. The court also listed several amendments which have been rejected by the Legislature. See generally Walman, Report of the Committee on Legislation of the Family Section of the New York State Bar Association, 46 N.Y.S.B.J. 275
(1974).
36. See, e.g., Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 26 N.E.2d 265 (1940); Phillips
v. Phillips, 1 App. Div. 2d 393, 150 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d
742, 138 N.E.2d 738, 157 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1956); Shuart v. Shuart, 183 Misc. 2d 270,
51 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
37. 5 Misc. 2d 4, 7, 158 N.YS.2d 909, 912 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
38. The pertinent statutory language reads:
Such direction [the court's direction for the husband to provide support] may
be made in the final judgment ... or by one or more orders from time to time
before or subsequent to final judgment, or by such order or orders and the final
judgment.
N.Y. Dom. RFL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1974). It has been noted, however, that
"[Niew York courts are reluctant to cut off even a 'guilty' wife from alimony, especially
when New York continues to have an absolute system of iiiarital property law." Foster
& Freed, Family Law, 25 SYAcusE L. REv. 401, 413-14 (1974). Such a case should
be distinguished from the situation where the court declines to award alimony. In the
misconduct case, the denial is final. In the case where alimony is simply not awarded,
DRL 236 allows a possible modification of the order based on changed circumstances,
and the wife's presumptive entitlement to the award is not lost.
39. See, e.g., Math v. Math, 39 App. Div. 2d 583, 331 N.Y.S.2d 964 (2d Dep't
1972) (modifying supreme court's order granting a divorce to plaintiff husband by
eliminating any alimony due to wife's misconduct); Smith v. Smith, 60 Misc. 2d 692,
303 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Fain. Ct. 1969) (dismissal of divorced wife's petition for a support
decree on grounds that her husband's divorce based on her cruel and inhuman treatment). See also Bruno v. Bruno, 70 Misc. 2d 284, 334 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1972)
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used its discretion to grant or deny awards "as, in the court's discretion justice requires . .. "40 In the case of Phillips v. Phillips,41 the
wife appealed the order of special term which granted her husband's
motion for examination of her income and assets as an aid in determining the amount of alimony to be granted in the final decree of
divorce. The appellate division affirmed and held that the financial
circumstances of the wife were a factor relevant to the court's determination of the amount of alimony "justice requires." The opinion
justified its results by reference to the statutory language itself, advances in economic opportunities for women, the fact that other states
take the wife's circumstances into account, and the interest of the
state in allocating economic burdens fairly. In the Doyle case, the
court further shaped judicial discretion in awarding alimony.
Why should ex-wives and separated women seek a preferred status
in which they shall toil not, neither shall they spin. Alimony was
originally devised by society to protect those without power of ownership or earning resources. It was never intended to assure a perpetual
state of secured indolence. It should not be suffered to convert a host
of physically and mentally competent women into an army of alimony
drones.4
More recently, the court of appeals in Kover v. Kover43 reaffirmed
the holding in Phillips, and approved the language added to DRL 236
specifying that courts making an alimony award consider the wife's
ability to be self-supporting. The court enumerated other factors
relevant to a court's determination, including "the husband's financial
resources and the established standard of living of the parties, the age
and health of the parties and, to a limited extent, their conduct." 44
Thus, in interpreting DRL 236, the courts have assumed a realistic posture with respect to the application and effects of alimony
awards. Indeed, the court of appeals in Kover noted that "the times
have changed, owing not alone to the coequal status which a married
(in husband's actions for annulment or divorce, wife denied alimony on ground that her
misconduct could have been the basis for a divorce if the court had chosen to grant it
instead of the annulment).
40. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
41. 1 App. Div. 2d 393, 150 N.Y.S.2d 646 (kst Dep't 1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 742,
138 N.E.2d 738, 157 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1956).
42. 5 Misc. 2d at 7, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
43. 29 N.Y.2d 408, 278 N.E.2d 886, 328 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1972).
44. Id. at 415, 278 N.E.2d at 889, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 645 (citations omitted).
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woman today shares with her husband but also to the increase in the
number of married women working in gainful occupations." 45 However, because DRL 236 does not specifically authorize alimony for husbands, the courts have thus far refused to go so far as to make such an
award.
The judicial discretion included within the ambit of DRL 23646
creates the further possibility of unequal treatment in its application
by the courts due to possible judicial sex-role bias or stereotyping.4 7
For example, a judge who views husbands as "bread-winners" and
wives as "homemakers" might be inclined to favor wives in an
alimony award. Such discrimination would clearly be difficult to
measure but nevertheless it is reasonable to presume that such bias
might be present.
III. Tim

EFFECTS OF THE

ERA

ON

DRL 236

A. The ERA By-Passes the Equal Protection Argument
It is arguable that DRL 236 is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. 3
The basis of the argument is that sex classifications even if not "suspect" are at least subject to active review in light of recent United
States Supreme Court decisions in the area. 49 Such review would require the state to establish an interest in denying alimony to husbands
which is more than merely legislatively reasonable. In Husband M.
v, Wife M.,50 a recent decision by the Delaware Supreme Court, the
court upheld a state statute favoring wives in property divisions made
after a divorce against an equal protection attack. The state interest
advanced was the power to regulate marital status in order to assure
45.
46.
N.Y.S.2d
47.

Id. at 414, 278 N.B.2d at 888, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
See id. See also Brownstein v. Brownstein, 25 App. Div. 2d 205, 207, 268
115, 119 (1st Dep't 1966).
See Comment, supra note 15.

48. See Fisher & Saxe, Family Support Obligations, 46 N.Y.S.B.J. 441 (1974).

49. See cases cited note 13 supra. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
in which the presumption that an unwed father was unfit to raise his children and therefore denied a fitness hearing prior to the state taking custody was held to be a denial of
due process. The court further held that to deny such a hearing to an unwed father
while granting a hearing to married and divorced parents and unwed mothers, who are
presumed fit to raise their children, was a violation of the equal protection clause.
50. 321 A.2d 115 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1974).
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the wife her fair share of the marital estate. 51 The court specifically
stated, however, that the statute was not subject to "strict scrutiny"
because the United States Supreme Court decisions did not make sex
classifications "suspect." 52 The Delaware court found that the statute
was permissible under the "minimum rationality test" of equal protection which does not require that classifications be drawn with
mathematical precision.5 3 The court did note, however, that an exception to their conclusion might arise where there was "actual prejudice
to a husband-petitioner who [did] not fit into the husband-wife hypothesis [which constituted] the basis for the conclusion."5 4 The hypothesis that the court relied on was the husband as "bread-winner,"
wife as "homemaker" dichotomy. 5
It therefore appears doubtful that DRL 236 would be invalidated
under a similar equal protection attack. It can be argued, however,
that the statute is both over-inclusive, because all wives are presumptively entitled to alimony although perhaps some should not be, and
under-inclusive, because no husbands are presumptively entitled to
alimony although perhaps some should be. On that basis, the courts
might require that DRL 236 be redrawn to allow an alimony award
to the husbands who are presently eliminated by the statute's underinclusiveness. The resulting statute would thus be a logical extension
of the New York statute requiring a wife to support her husband
where "he is incapable of supporting himself or is likely to become a
public charge."'5 6 Such a duty would thus form the basis for alimony
to some husbands. 57 The ERA, however, would render the equal protection question moot.
B. The ERA Necessitates Modification of DRL 236
If it is argued that the ratification of the ERA will render sex a
prohibited classification 8 and will mandate equal treatment of the
51. Id. at 118-19.
52. Id. at 118.
53. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
54. 321 A.2d at 119 n.5. The footnote cites Murphy v. Murphy, 42 U.S.L.W. 2393
(Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 1974), a case in which the Georgia alimony statute was invalidated as violative of the equal protection clause of not only the United States
Constitution but the Georgia Constitution as well.
55. 321 A.2d at 118.
56. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 32(4) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
57. See generally Fisher & Saxe, supra note 48.
58. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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sexes in terms of their legal rights, the conclusion that DRL 236 must
be modified to allow husbands to obtain alimony is almost inescapable.5 9 Therefore, the issue is the extent to which DRL 286 must be
restructured in order to make it constitutional.
The minimum modification involves expunging all statutory
references to sexual classification, that is to husbands and wives, and
referring only to "spouses." DRL 236 would thus be rendered "sexneutral," would entitle either spouse to alimony, and in all probability would be constitutional under the ERA. Thus modified, DRL
236 would provide that "the court may direct one spouse to provide
suitably for the support of the other spouse as, in the court's discretion, justice requires. . . ." The words "spouse" or "the other spouse"
would also be substituted for the words "husband" and "wife" in the
remainder of the statute consistent with the above-quoted language.
An intermediate Pennsylvania appellate court used such an approach in Wiegand v. Wiegand.60 The case applied the recently passed
Equality of Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution 6' to
59. It is perhaps arguable that the ERA will not be interpreted by the courts as
prohibiting sex classifications, but instead will be interpreted as simply making sex
classifications suspect. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (four Justices
holding that sex classifications are suspect). This argument is essentially the same one
used by those opposed to the ERA, namely that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment can be interpreted as making sex a suspect classification. See,
e.g., Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.f. Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on the
judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (hearings on the proposed ERA).
If the ERA were interpreted to make sex classifications suspect, the state would
have to prove that there are policy reasons sufficiently compelling to support the statutory classifications denying husbands alimony. The counterargument to that position is
that while it might be admitted that the state has an interest in regulating marriage
and divorce, that interest is not sufficient to uphold a denial of alimony to all husbands
where some husbands can be proved to need alimony.
Thus, the difference between the "suspect" and "prohibited" approaches relates to
the relative burdens of proof involved. Under a "suspect" approach, the state's burden
is difficult. Under a "prohibited" approach, their burden would be impossible because
the position demands that, but for the two exceptions indicated in the text of this
Comment, there are no state interests compelling enough to justify sex classification.
60. 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973). For a commentary on this case, see
78 DIcK. L. Rnv. 402 (1973).
61. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27, which, as amended, provides:
Prohibition against denial or abridgement of equality of rights because of sex.
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.
The language is very close to that in the federal ERA, so it is arguable that the application of the Pennsylvania ERA to a Pennsylvania alimony statute might provide a
precedent for application of the federal amendment.
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a state statute 2 which entitled wives, but not husbands, to alimony
pendente lite. The court held the statute unconstitutional, and noted
that if the alimony statute made alimony pendente lite available "to
either spouse who meets the legislative requirements specified,"0 3 such
legislation "would clearly meet the Constitutional test of the Amendment." 64 The comment by the court was essentially dicta and the decision is questionable authority because the parties to the action litigated the case on a different theory. 5 Nevertheless, it does provide an
indication of how a court might construe such a change if made by the
legislature.
A second modification of DRL 236 arguably required by the ERA
is a change in the statutory presumption favoring alimony for the wife
implicit in the statutory language which grants the court the power
to "direct the husband to provide suitably for the support of the
wife." 6 If, as has been suggested, the minimum modification of DRL
236 would be one permitting both spouses alimony on an equal basis,
the next issue is whether DRL 236 should be further modified in
order to make the presumptive entitlement to alimony "sex-neutral."
If the presumption is not changed, the effect will be to impose unequal burdens of proof on the parties. The wife's proof would be
limited to the question of amount. The husband would have to prove
first that he falls within an exception to the "no presumptive entitlement for husbands" notion, and second, the amount to be awarded.
On the other hand, if the presumption is changed to entitle both
parties to alimony, the burden of proof for either spouse would
relate to the level or amount of entitlement and would thus be equal62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 46 (Supp. 1974). The statute reads as follows: "In

case of divorce from the bonds of matrimony or bed and board, the court may, upon
petition, in proper cases, allow a wife reasonable alimony pendente lite ....
" (emphasis
added).
63. 226 Pa. Super. at 282, 310 A.2d at 428.
64. Id.
65. There had been a previous order by the lower court for alimony pendente
lite, counsel fees, and expenses to the wife who then sought additional support which

was eventually granted. The husband appealed the additional award on the grounds that
it was excessive and also that the court was in error in refusing to allow cross-examination of the wife as to how she had disbursed the proceeds of the first award and whether
she had other funds. These were the only issues argued before the appellate court. The
case resulted in a four to three decision; the dissent did not reach the ERA issues.
66. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1974). The fact that the
statute does not authorize alimony for husbands also implies a presumption favoring
wives. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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ized for both husband and wife. It should be noted that the amount
issue can be resolved on the basis of factors other than sex, whereas
the entitlement issue is presently grounded in notions of sex-based
distinctions. In sum, the full implication of the ERA requires that
DRL 236 be modified so that it is clear that both wives and husbands
are presumptively entitled to alimony awards, 7 and that the issue to
be decided is limited to the amount to be awarded including an
award of zero.
The third area of modification of DRL 236 relates to that portion
of the statute which permits a judge to make awards "as . . .justice
requires . . . . ,,s This language results in broad discretion and the
possibility that such discretion might be used to deny alimony to
husbands. 9 Such a situation would be partially foreclosed by the
second modification granting a presumptive entitlement to alimony
to both wives and husbands. However, judicial bias favoring wives
may be hard to remove70 until criteria governing alimony awards to
husbands are developed by courts in actual cases subsequent to modification of DRL 236.

IV.

SUGGESTED DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS

A. Background Considerations
In general, the New York courts tend to grant alimony awards
on a case-by-case basis by weighing such factors as the relative financial
resources'of the spouses, the length of time the parties were married,
the standard of living of the parties before the divorce, and the pro67. The statute might also be worded to indicate that there is no presumptive
entitlement to alimony by either party. In that case, it would be presumed that alimony
would not be necessary for either party. Both would have to prove entitlement and

amount necessary.
68. N.Y. Dost. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
69. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra. See generally Comment, supra
note 15. The phrase "as . . . justice requires," has been limited by the standards listed
in DRL 236 and those developed through case law. See Kover v. Kover, 29 N.Y.2d 408,
278 N.E.2d 886, 328 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1972).
70. See Comment, supra note 15. The courts have also been reluctant to change.
an award on appeal. "It should be noted that, in reaching a decision, this court will
not review the propriety of the appellate division's award, even if it differs from the
trial court's, unless the reduction or increase is so gross and excessive as to show an
abuse of judicial discretion." Kover v. Kover, 29 N.Y.2d 408, 417, 278 N.E.2d 886, 890,
328 N.Y.S.2d 641, 646 (1972).
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spective ability of the receiving spouse to be self-supporting. 1 Moreover, the New York legislature has stated that fault is also a factor
relevant to an alimony award, at least to the extent that a wife can
be denied alimony as a result of her misconduct.7 2 The discussion of
the operation of DRL 236 has presented some of these standards as
73
applied by the courts.

One criterion frequently applied is the wife's ability to be selfsupporting. A factor relevant to that consideration is the presence or
absence of children. In Brownstein v. Brownstein,7 4 the appellate division upheld an award made to a wife whose action for divorce had
been dismissed for lack of proof.7 5 The court upheld the award because the wife had custody of the children and therefore would "be
expected and required to devote a considerable portion of her time
to their care, guidance and well-being," 76 and would "not be com77
pelled to work to the detriment of her children."
On the other hand, a consolidated case, Kover v. Kover,78 presented three situations on appeal in which the parties had no children.
In the first situation, Kover v., Kover,79 the court indicated that the
reasons for denying an alimony award were that "the couple was
childless, the wife was still in her thirties and capable of supporting
herself, the marriage was of moderately short duration and the income
s In both the second situation,
of the spouses almost equaL" 80
Miraldi
v. Miraldi,81 and the third, Dulber v. Dulber,82 the court upheld
71. Under the divorce provisions of the New York Domestic Relations Law, a
husband and wife can enter into a separation agreement as the basis for a divorce.
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170(6) (McKinney Supp. 1974). Many couples seeking a
divorce establish financial settlements out of court under such agreements.
72. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
73. See text accompanying notes 30-47 supra.
74. 25 App. Div. 2d 205, 268 N.Y.S.2d 115 (lst Dep't 1966). This case was
decided before 1968, when DRL 236 was amended to include the phrase "the ability
of the wife to be self supporting." The case upheld the award of alimony to the wife
upon the failure of her action for absolute divorce. The facts of the case can be distinguished from a case in which an award is made upon divorce of the parties. Nonetheless, the standard for setting the award is the same in either case but for the exception that the court will not award alimony to a wife simply to give her the means to
live separately from her husband and yet remain married.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 210, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
77. Id.
78. 29 N.Y.2d 408, 278 N.E.2d 886, 328 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1972).
79. Id. at 417, 278 N.E.2d at 890, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
80. Id. at 418, 278 N.E.2d at 890, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
81. Id. at 418, 278 N.E.2d at 891, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
82. Id. at 419, 278 N.E.2d at 891, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
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moderate awards to the wife ($100 per week in the former and $42.50
per week in the latter) on the basis of the "difference in the earnings
of each of the parties."5 31 However, in the Miraldi case, the court also
appeared to be affected by the fact that the husband was a physician
making over $30,000 annually at the time of the divorce action and
that he had been required to pay alimony to the wife under a separation decree she had obtained seven years earlier on the grounds of his
abandonment. Given, then, the criteria courts have established under
the present DRL 236 for use in their determination of alimony, the
issue is to what extent, if any, will these standards be altered by an
ERA-modified DRL 236.
A recent Florida case84 granted a husband an alimony award by
applying the state alimony statute8 5 (which permits an alimony
award to either spouse) where he had been granted a dissolution of
marriage from his wife. The district court of appeals affirmed the lower
court judgment but modified the result by excising his alimony award.
The court, in addition to the statutory guidelines" and its finding
that the husband had no need, applied the following standard as a
basis for its decision:
We have the view, however, that no matter which direction the flow
of alimony may take, its basic nature and purpose remains the same
as heretofore, i.e. to provide nourishment, sustenance and the necessities of life to a former spouse who has neither the resources nor
ability to be self-sustaining. We expressly hold that just as heretofore

the wife's entitlement to alimony depended upon a showing of her
need and the husband's ability to pay... so now the husband's en83. Id. at 420, 278 N.E.2d at 892, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 649. In Dulber, the husband
was earning about $14,000 per year and the wife about $8,800 per year at the time of
the divorce action. The lower court had denied alimony to the wife, but the appellate
division awarded $42.50 per week, which was the award upheld by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 419-20, 278 N.E.2d at 891, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
84. Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (Supp. 1974). The statute reads as follows:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage the court may grant alimony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent in
nature. In any award of alimony, the court may order periodic payments or
payments in lump sum or both. The court may consider the adultery of a
spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony shall be
awarded to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded
to such spouse.
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony, the court may consider
any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.
86. Id.
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titlement to alimony87depends upon a showing of his need and the
wife's ability to pay.
The case suggests that present criteria for determining alimony may
be applied by courts in determining an appropriate award for a husband under an ERA-modified DRL 236. It is reasonable to assume
that courts would follow such a course because of their familiarity
with the basic concepts involved. The approach would appear to be
acceptable under ERA standards as long as those criteria are applied
equally. Moreover, unequal application in specific instances would be
subject to appellate review.
B. Hypotheticals
In order to explore some of the implications of present criteria
when applied to husbands, the facts of the Brownstein, Kover, Miraldi,
and Dulber cases will be analyzed with the roles of husband and wife
reversed. First, however, it should be pointed out that the issue of
property division is an important aspect of the relative financial positions of a husband and wife and may affect the court's determination
of a spouse's need for support and ability to provide self-support.8 8
Therefore, in the following hypotheticals the alimony will presumably
be awarded only to the extent that a property division leaves a spouse
in need of further support.80
In Brownstein, the wife was awarded alimony because she had
custody of the children and the court refused to compel her to work
to their detriment, even though she was trained as a dentist with a
specialty in periodonture and had been working four days per week.00
The court reasoned that the husband could easily afford alimony payments, that the decision was in the best interest of the children, and
that alimony would "permit [the wife] to fully enjoy her maternal
rights and to completely fulfill her parental obligations."' 1 The court
87. 264 So. 2d at 113-14.
88. See note 71 supra & accompanying text.
89. There is a related question which is beyond the scope of this Comment,
namely, whether the property laws of a state treat husbands and wives unequally with
respect to property division upon divorce. See Bingaman, The Effects of an Equal

Rights Amendment on the New Mexico System of Community Property, 3 N. MEx. L.
R y. 11 (1973); Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law,
48 WAsHr. L. REv. 527 (1973); Note, Equal Rights and Equal Protection, 46 S.CAL.

L.REv. 892 (1973).
90. 25 App. Div.2d at 210, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 123.

91. Id.
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used alimony as a means of adding to the wife's self-support to increase her total income to a specific level. The decision implies that
the wife's custody of the children creates the presumption that she
needs support 92 to the extent that maternal obligations preclude fulltime work.
The reverse-Brownstein situation presents the issue of whether a
husband or, indeed, whether a spouse can be awarded alimony under
an ERA-modified DRL 236 on the sole basis of having custody of
children. The Brownstein result would say "yes" on the basis that the
best interests of the children require the parent to be with them as
much as possible. However, it might be argued that the Brownstein
result does not apply to husbands because wives can be treated differently under the ERA where a characteristic truly unique to them
is involved. In this case, that characteristic is "motherhood." Thus,
instead of being forced to work, a wife could be awarded alimony when
she has custody of the children because they require the presence of
a mother but not a father. The argument is not convincing, however, in that the uniqueness of "motherhood" does not necessarily
imply that children do not require the presence of a father to the same
degree as a mother. Moreover, the fact that the wife has already
worked while married further undercuts the argument. The best interests of a child arguably require the presence of a parent, whichever
spouse that happens to be, and as such, it is arguable that neither
spouse having custody should be compelled to work to an extent which
would deprive the children of a considerable portion of that parent's
time.
The present standard which presumes the need for alimony by
a wife having custody of the children is thus theoretically applicable
to a husband under the ERA. However, the bare application of this
standard raises further issues with respect to working spouses. In
Brownstein, for example, the wife was a dentist who had worked during the marriage. If, after divorce, she chooses to pursue a full-time
career she clearly could support herself,9 3 in which case there would
be no need for alimony support from the husband. The same would
be true if the husband were in that situation. A spouse might choose
not to work in which case he or she would be entitled to alimony
92. The need for support refers to support of the spouse as distinguished from
child support payments which are for a child's needs.
93. The wife could, for instance, hire live-in help or use day-care services.
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under a narrow reading of the Brownstein rationale, which allows a
spouse to fulfill parental obligations. The argument against the application of the Brownstein rationale under the ERA is that awarding
alimony to a capable spouse who chooses not to work places an unnecessary financial burden on the spouse who would have to pay any
alimony awarded, and therefore awards are unnecessary in such circumstances. The net effect of such an argument is that a capable
spouse would be compelled to work for personal support rather than
receive it at the other spouse's expense. Any hardships resulting from
this policy could be ameliorated by a narrow definition of the phrase
"capable spouse," provided that the definition did not discriminate
between husbands and wives.
The ultimate resolution of these issues will in large part turn on
the legislative determination of public policy considerations underlying DRL 236. For example, if the policy of using alimony as a deterrent to divorce were advocated,04 the argument against awarding
alimony to capable spouses choosing not to work where there are children would be justifiable because such a position would make divorce
costly. However, since the deterrence policy has been weakened by
the addition of "no-fault" grounds for divorce in New York, 5 the
"no alimony to work-capable spouses" position would be supportable
by a policy of compelling such spouses to support themselves. The
legislature might instead decide that spouses should not be compelled
to work where they have custody of children and thus permit alimony
awards. As indicated by the Brownstein hypotheticals, either of the
two preceding approaches would be acceptable under the ERA. A
third legislative position might be a policy of equity whereby DRL
236 would leave the choice of work, no work or some work up to the
spouse taking the children. This result could be accomplished by using
a sliding-scale approach to alimony wherein a spouse would receive
alimony in amounts inversely proportional to amounts made working, and perhaps also in combination with an allowance for day-care
expenses over and above any other child support awarded.
94. The deterrence aspect of alimony is based on the state's interest in maintaining the marital relationship. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, I App. Div. 2d 393, 150

N.Y.S.2d 646 (1st Dep't 1956), in which Justice Botein stated that "[tfhe abiding

interest of the State is in the preservation of the family, and in maintaining it as a
self-sufficient, independent unit." Id. at 397, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 651. See also Brownstein
v. Brownstein, 25 App. Div. 2d 205, 209, 268 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1st Dep't 1966).
95. N.Y. Doia. REL. LAw § 170(6) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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in Kover, Miraldi, and Dulber, the problems posed by the presence of children are avoided. The reverse-Kover hypothetical poses a
situation where the wife earns $14,000 annually and the husband
nearly $11,000. If present standards were applied, the husband would
not be granted alimony because he is capable of supporting himself
and because his income is nearly equal to that of his wife. These
standards-need and capability of self-support-would be acceptable
under the ERA because they can be determined without regard to
sexual distinctions. Thus, if either the husband or the wife in reverseKover were unable to work they could be awarded alimony on the
basis of need.
If the facts of the reverse-Kover situation are varied to hypothesize that the husband had paid for his wife's training to enable her
to obtain a $14,000 per year position, the question of an alimony
award would turn on a construction of the legislative judgment concerning the purpose and function of alimony. If alimony is compensatory, then the husband arguably would be entitled to an award,
presumably lump-sum, as compensation or remuneration for the
amounts he provided for his wife's education. On the other hand, if
the legislative judgment as to the function of alimony is not clear or is
placed within the court's discretion, the ERA requires that the court's
award rest on a function equally applicable to husbands and wives.
The outcome in reverse-Kover might then be either alimony awarded
as compensation for sums expended on a spouse's advancement or no
alimony based on the present fact that both spouses are self-supporting.
A compensational function applied to Brownstein would require an
award to the spouse who paid for the other spouse's training if, in fact,
the training was paid for in that manner. A judgment that need, selfsupport capability, or other such criteria limits the compensation function might result in no alimony award to the spouses in both Brownstein and reverse-Kover.
Taking the reverse-Kover hypothetical one step further presents
a situation where the incomes of husband and wife are not equal. Such
are the facts in both the reverse-Miraldiand reverse-Dulber situations.
Under the reverse-Miraldi facts, the wife would be earning $33,000
per year as a physician and the husband about $2,500 per year as a
real-estate salesman. In reverse-Dulber, the wife would be earning
$14,000 per year and the husband $8,800. In both cases the applica-
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tion of present standards under the ERA would result in alimony
awards to the husband based on the disparity between the earnings of
husband and wife, and the desire to equalize those incomes. These
criteria conflict with the "need" and "capability of self-support" criteria because both husbands are clearly capable of at least minimal
self-support.
The resolution of such conflicts will turn on the legislative or
judicial judgments as to which function of alimony is to be predominant. If alimony is to be primarily a means of maintaining the same
support as existed during the marriage, then awards under the ERA
could be made, as in Miraldi and Dulber, to whichever spouse was
supported during the marriage.0 6 If self-support is to be predominant,
the result would be either no awards or very limited awards in reverse-Miraldi and reverse-Dulber.If a fault basis for alimony is to be
emphasized, as it arguably was in Miraldi and Dulber, then the ERA
suggests only that such a purpose be applied equally without regard
to sex.
C. Models
As the foregoing hypotheticals have suggested, a major effect of
the ERA on DRL 236 will be to focus attention on the public policy
considerations underlying alimony awards. Such legislative scrutiny
might also lead to a consideration of changing views as to what marriage is, whether those views necessitate a different structure of alimony, and whether they are perhaps more consistent with the notion
of equality between the sexes which the ERA mandates.
The Report of the Task Force on Family Law and Policy to the
Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women"7 views marriage
as an economic partnership and suggests that alimony criteria should
be consistent with such a view. The Report views alimony as:
1) [recognizing a] contribution made by a spouse to the family's wellbeing which would otherwise be without recompense.
96. See generally Gabler, supra note 14, at 60-61. Gabler argues that the effect
of the ERA with respect to support "would be to place the responsibility upon the
spouses with due regard to their respective contributions to the marriage." Thus, support would continue after divorce by way of alimony, and the awards would be allowed
to either spouse on the basis of contribution. Id. at 86.
97. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW AND POLICY, REPORT TO THE CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1968).
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2) [providing] recompense for loss of earning capacity suffered by

either spouse because of the marriage.
3) [recognizing] some continued responsibility on the part of the
other spouse to meet [financial needs of the other] for a period of
time after... dissolution ....98

Within such a framework, alimony functions as simply one way of
"dosing out the accounts" of an economic partnership, and because
such a function is not based upon sexual distinctions, it would be acceptable under the ERA. There is a potential for abuse if such criteria
are colored by the historical bias in favor of wives which is based on
the husband's statutory duty of support. For example, a husband might
be perceived as having more "continued responsibility" than a wife
if historical bias were given effect under the Task Force's proposal.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act views property division
upon dissolution of marriage as the "primary means of providing for
the future financial needs of the spouses," 99 and alimony, which the
Act terms "maintenance," is therefore introduced only when property
division provides insufficient resources. 100 Section 308 of the Act proposes a two-step procedure whereby either spouse may be awarded
maintenance: first, a court determination of whether a spouse has need
beyond the proceeds of the property division; and, second, an award
made by the court in light of certain factors including, inter alia, financial resources, age and health, and time necessary for acquiring
job training or education. 101 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
98. Id. at 8-9.
99. See UNIFORM MANRIAGB AND DIvoRCE

ACT,

Prefatory Note (Final Draft

1970).
100. Id. § 308(a) (Rev. Final Draft 1974).
101. Id. § 308. The section reads in pertinent part:
(a) . . . the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if
it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:

(1) lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or

is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make
it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment
outside the home.
(b) The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for such periods of time
as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after

considering all relevant factors including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his

needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for
support of a child living with the party included a sum for that party

as custodian;
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like the Report, avoids sex-based distinctions and attempts to set alimony criteria which are based upon individual characteristics. As such,
the standards it suggests would be acceptable under the ERA, although
they too could be applied in a discriminatory way. In sum, both the
Act and the Report might serve as useful models for the New York
legislature in its modification of DRL 236.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

The ERA, if ratified, will clearly compel the modification of
DRL 236 at least to the extent suggested in the preceding sections.
It is probable that in modifying DRL 236, the New York State Legislature will have to address itself to a review and possible alteration of
the public policies and purposes behind the alimony statute. In all,
any changes in the statute will have to provide a procedure whereby
alimony or maintenance awards can be made without discrimination
on the basis of sex.
Although the statutory modification of DRL 236 will work an
extensive change in the approach to alimony, the actual application
of the statute may well produce less dramatic change. It is reasonable
to assume that, initially, the net effect of a modified DRL 236 will be
to increase the number of husbands who actually receive alimony
awards from zero to a figure somewhat but not much greater than
zero. For example, under the suggested criteria, an award would be
made to a stay-at-home husband who has been supported by his wife
during the marriage. However, because such role-reversal situations
are not common at present, the number of alimony awards granted
under such circumstances would be very small. Moreover, the number
of husbands who could receive alimony because of incapacity to be
self-supporting is also presumably quite small. The number of alimony
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficiept education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse
seeking maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to
meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
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awards to husbands will increase, however, as more husbands are encouraged to seek awards in light of probable requirements that a wife
pay alimony where, for example, the husband has custody of the children or has contributed to his wife's career advancement at the expense of his own. On the other hand, it seems likely that many wives
will still receive alimony on the basis of essentially sex-neutral criteria
for granting awards (such as those discussed in the hypotheticals). If
the ERA encourages a greater emphasis on self-support and stricter
requirements for need, the result will probably be fewer awards to
wives, awards extending over more limited periods, and awards of
lesser amounts.
In the context of alterations in public policy, the ERA will serve
as a powerful catalyst, moving the New York Legislature and courts
more forcefully towards a balanced and equitable approach to the
alimony issue. The ERA would thus reinforce the current trends recently indicated by Henry Foster and Doris Freed, well-known authors in the field of domestic relations.
Two by-products of new no-fault divorce legislation are the increasing availability of alimony for husands and an emphasis of the
economic aspects of alimony, such as actual need and ability to pay.
In addition, there may be a trend towards viewing marriage as a
partnership of co-equals and excising the fault element from de-

terminations as to alimony or the distribution of property upon di2
vorce.10
The leading article on the ERA draws a similar conclusion, noting
that "the effect of the ERA on marriage and divorce law will be to
move the law more directly, more forcefully, and more expeditiously
in the direction it is already going."' 03
Finally, because it will mandate equal treatment of husbands and
wives with respect to alimony and stimulate an appraisal of and probable change in policies underlying alimony, the ERA will be a force in
bringing about change in the structure of marriage as an institution.
For example, the working wife and stay-at-home husband concept
would become a more acceptable option, as would other newly emerg102. Foster & Freed, Family Law, 25 SY-AcusE L. Rxv. 401, 402-03 (1974)
(footnotes omitted).
103. Brown, supra note 7, at 937.
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ing life styles. The ERA will also encourage further change in traditional notions concerning the respective roles of men and women and
husbands and wives in the family structure and in society. Moreover,
such changes will in effect reinforce each other and result in the eventual realization of the intended effect of the ERA-the equal treatment of individuals under the law. In sum, these changes will develop slowly and, indeed, can be expected to take years as the New
York Legislature makes statutory changes, as New York courts implement those changes, and as those changes are absorbed into the mainstream of everyday life.
RicHARD H. MURPHY

